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Abstract 
 The tension between cooperative and selfish impulses is a challenge for every society. But 
how is this problem perceived by individual participants in the context of a behavioral games 
experiment? We first assess individual differences in players’ propensity to cooperate or 
defect in a series of experimental games. We then use open-ended interviews with a subset of 
those players to investigate the various concepts (or ‘frames’) they use when thinking about 
self-interested and cooperative actions. More generally, we hope to raise awareness of 
player’s perceptions of experimental environments to inform both the design and 
interpretation of experiments and experimental data. 
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Introduction:   
 
  Cooperation is the foundation of human social life. Although progress toward an 
adequate understanding of cooperation has been made in recent years it remains insufficiently 
understood. Cooperative choices benefit the group, and are thus collectively rational, but 
sometimes those choices for an individual imply that the fundamental assumption of both 
economics and evolutionary biology - that of individual self-interest - has been violated. This 
tension between cooperative and competitive impulses is an ancient dilemma in all human 
societies, but how is this problem perceived by individuals? 
  For much of the twentieth century economics was concerned principally with the 
underlying mathematical structure of its models, not with social context or actual human 
psychology. This perspective was also adopted in game theory as it developed in the mid-
twentieth century. Although many game theorists still view game theory as intended only to 
describe idealized players inhabiting abstract worlds rather than real players in human 
societies, this view is being increasingly challenged both in game theory and economics more 
generally (see Bruni and Sugden 2007). As Gold and Sugden comment in Bacharach (2006, 
p.xvi):  
“Conventional game theory confuses the world as seen by the theorist with the world 
as seen by the decision-making agent. In constructing a stylized mathematical model 
of an interaction, the game theorist imposes a particular conceptual scheme on the 
world.”  
We don’t pursue this debate here, but simply note that it is to the behavioral approach to 
game theory that this paper seeks to make a contribution.  
There is currently no one accepted ‘best approach’ to the study of cooperation. It 
remains a significant problem not only in the social sciences but also in economics and   3 
evolutionary biology, where the concept carries considerable theoretical weight. Influential 
approaches from economics include, inter alia, Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), Sugden (1993, 
2003), Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004), Burnham and Johnson (2005) and Bacharach 
(2006). Most of these and numerous other scholars have run experiments under the broad 
umbrella of ‘behavioral game theory’ in the rather artificial context of a laboratory (see 
Camerer 2003 for a review), but to what extent do the experimentalists’ assumptions about 
how players interpret their environment coincide with players’ actual perceptions? 
  We present an analysis of interviews with university students about the ways in which 
they played a set of one-shot Prisoners Dilemma and Chicken games, as well as one Dictator 
and one Ultimatum game. Games such as these are routinely used by economists to explore 
aspects of human cooperation and competition.  In a larger study, of which these interviews 
are a part, we used this series of games to ask questions about the sources and circumstances 
of self-interested and cooperative human action. Secondly, we can identify possible 
connections between play across these games. Thirdly, we wanted to use established 
methodologies from anthropology in a novel application to economics. Finally, we hope to 
raise researchers’ awareness in the wider field of behavioural game theory of players’ 
perceptions such as those presented in the body of this paper. Such knowledge can inform 
both the future design of experiments and the understanding of experimental data. 
 
1. Description of the Games 
1.a)   Prisoner’s Dilemma 
  In a standard two-person “Prisoner’s Dilemma” (PD) game, each player chooses to 
cooperate or defect. There are four possible outcomes: both players co-operate, so each 
receives (Reward); both players defect, so each receives (Punishment) (R&P together 
constituting the ‘main diagonal’); one player cooperates, one defects; so the cooperator   4 
receives (Sucker) and the defector receives (Temptation). The PD game’s payoffs always 
satisfy: T > R > P > S.  
  The following diagram shows the first Prisoner’s Dilemma game the students were 
asked to play. In our notation ‘cooperate’ is always choice ‘A’ and ‘defect’ is choice ‘B’. 
Figure 1: The 2x2 PD Game 
 
 
 
 
      
       
  The PD game has a dominant-strategy equilibrium for both players of [B, B]. 
However economists call this self-interested solution ‘Pareto inferior’ as each player views 
[B, B] as less preferred than [A, A]. The cooperative joint outcome [A, A] (also the payoff-
dominant outcome; Harsanyi and Selten 1988) can only be achieved if each player is 
motivated by the ‘best for both’ aspect of an ‘A’ choice, and has sufficient trust that the other 
player will share that motivation. A willingness to bear risk, as well as a cooperative 
disposition, is then required before a player can justify choosing option ‘A’.  Both risk-
aversion and selfishness can independently lead an individual to a ‘B’ choice (see Colman 
1995). Social psychologists use the payoff difference [T-R] to measure the greed incentive, 
and [P-S] to measure the fear motive, and both are present in the PD (Simpson 2006). 
To illustrate the importance of the differing implicit preconceptions even eminent 
scholars bring to the study of the one-shot PD, perhaps reflecting different assumptions about 
the purpose of economic models, consider the following statements. Anatol Rapoport (1989 
p.203) comments:  
    Player 2 
 
Player 1 
  A  B 
A  4,4  0,6 
B  6,0  2,2   5 
“The different prescriptions of decisions based on individual and collective rationality 
in some conflict situations cast doubt on the very meaningfulness of the facile 
definition of ‘rationality’ as effective maximization of one’s own expected gains”  
But in the same volume Aumann (1989 p.23), although not addressing Rapoport, stridently 
opposes any effort to justify a cooperative choice in the one-shot PD game:  
“Worse than just nonsense, this is actually vicious, since it suggests that the prisoner’s 
dilemma does not represent a real social problem that must be dealt with”.  
However, List (2006) presents evidence from a TV game show which finds a 
significant minority of participants choose cooperatively in a situation analogous to the PD, 
even when thousands of dollars are at stake, implying the social problem represented in the 
PD may be less widespread than Aumann fears. More recently, Bacharach’s (2006) theory 
has provided a broader framework which can encompass both perspectives. In particular the 
discussion contained in pp.169-175 presents a perspective that seems compatible with the 
body of evidence from social psychology (Colman et al 2008). Bacharach argues that the 
main diagonal of a symmetric PD game will for some people prompt a perceptual frame in 
which players’ perceived common interest leads them to identify as part of a dyad and the 
choice to be made as one for ‘us’ rather than for ‘me’. 
Gold and Sugden note in Bacharach (2006) that Bacharach hoped
1 to build the agents’ 
frames- “the sets of descriptions that the players use to represent the problem to themselves” 
into the model of a game
2
                                                 
1 Gold and Sugden brought Bacharach’s unfinished work to fruition following his untimely death in 2002. 
. Frames are then the set of concepts used when one thinks about 
one’s situation in a games context. ‘We’-thinking is the frame players may bring to a decision 
that in certain circumstances can lead them to pursue joint-payoff maximization. (See also 
Tomasello et al. (2005) on the evolution and development of the uniquely human capacity for 
   6 
“shared” or “we” intentionality.) For other players no such frame is prompted and the 
problem is perceived as one for ‘me’. Bacharach (2006, p.170) likens this to the famous 
drawing which some perceive as a dark vase but others perceive as two opposing white faces.  
Bacharach’s approach is not restricted to Prisoner’s Dilemma-type games, but 
explicitly applies more broadly to coordination games and other common interest games, 
including Chicken games, although it does not apply to constant sum games. As we share 
Bacharach’s approach we let our subjects interpret the games as they see fit, passing no 
judgment on the “rationality” of either their decisions or explanations.  
 
1b)   Chicken 
There are important similarities and differences between PD and Chicken games. The 
Chicken Game takes a similar form to PD, except that the payoff rankings always satisfy: T > 
R > S > P; the first such game our participants played is shown in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2: The 2x2 Chicken Game 
 
 
 
 
   
 
In a Chicken game there is also a tension between cooperative and selfish impulses. 
But now mutual cautiousness leads to outcome [A, A] if both players avoid the lowest 
minimum. Option B is only selected by players who are willing to take on risk and also seek 
an advantage over the other. Referring back to the payoff differences introduced earlier, the 
Chicken game retains the greed incentive of [T-R] but the fear motive for defection is now 
                                                                                                                                                        
2 Bacharach’s ‘variable frame’ theory is described in more detail in Bacharach and Bernasconi (1997). This 
    Player 2 
 
Player 1 
  A  B 
A  5,5  4,14 
B  14,4  2,2   7 
negative, suggesting risk-aversion should promote cooperation. The Chicken game is less 
controversial than the PD at least because a cooperative choice can be rational whether a 
player sees the choice as for ‘us’ or as one for ‘me’. It is the frequency of ‘A’-choices rather 
than the existence of ‘A’-choices that creates a puzzle for standard theory. Importantly, 
Thaler and Camerer (2003) argue Chicken is more suited to investigating cooperative versus 
competitive tensions than Dilemma games, because the ‘fear’ motive for defection is 
eliminated. 
 
1c)   Ultimatum and Dictator Games 
  Ultimatum and Dictator Games, while quite different to PD and Chicken Games, are 
also well-known. In the Ultimatum Game a proposer offers a division of $30 and a responder 
chooses whether to accept or decline. If he accepts, the division is as proposed; if he declines, 
each party gets zero. In the Ultimatum game economic theory suggests only a tiny offer will 
be made by a proposer which is also accepted by a responder. In contrast, numerous 
experiments have found a prevalence of substantial proposer offers. In our Dictator game a 
dictator also proposes a division of $30, but this time the responder has no choice but to 
accept any proposal. Economic theory now predicts an offer of zero in the Dictator game, but 
as with the Ultimatum game, many experiments find positive offers from the proposer 
suggesting anomalous generosity. 
 
1d)   The Frames 
  Partly with the hope of assisting economists’ model development, we interviewed 
subjects to probe their conscious motives, rather as the labor and macroeconomic literature 
does when business leaders are interviewed to shed light on issues such as downward wage 
                                                                                                                                                        
usage of ‘frame’ should not be confused with experimentalists’ manipulation of descriptions to investigate   8 
rigidity (e.g., Campbell and Kamlani 1997; Bewley 1998)
3
  Another reason that we are interested in subjects’ perceptions of their decisions to 
cooperate or defect is that we assume that frames necessarily intervene between any evolved 
psychobiological potentials to cooperate or compete and the player’s experimental 
environment. Indeed we argue that frames are necessarily a part of, or reflect, any 
psychological mechanism whereby such dispositions to action become action. Bacharach 
(2006, chapter 3) makes a radical attempt to unify facets of economic and evolutionary 
theories of cooperation as both adaptive and rational using the concept of contingent ‘we’-
thinking. He also derives an evolutionary explanation for the origins of the potential for ‘we-
thinking’ frames based upon the evolutionary origins of group identification: 
. Our interviews were designed to 
elicit material that would help us to identify and describe the frames used by the students to 
guide or rationalize their decisions to cooperate or defect in these games. Subjects’ reflections 
can help us to better understand the perceptions that influence play in these kinds of 
laboratory environments. In particular, we sought to discover whether any of the following 
conceptualizations from the behavioral game theory literature finds support in players’ 
reflections: self-interest, fairness, ‘we’-thinking, inequality-aversion (Bolton and Ockenfels 
2000) and guilt-aversion (Battigalli and Dufwenberg 2007). Or are there other models that 
better account for players’ actions?  
“Group identity implies affective attitudes which are behaviorally equivalent to altruism 
in Dilemmas, and it can explain what altruism cannot, notably human success in 
common-interest encounters” (p.111).  
  Although not referenced by Bacharach, we suggest one proximate mechanism for how 
‘we’-thinking is manifested in individual affective attitudes can be explained using 
Damasio’s (1994) ‘Somatic Marker Hypothesis’. This hypothesis holds that because nature 
                                                                                                                                                        
‘framing effects’.   9 
‘built the apparatus of rationality [the cerebral cortex] not just on top of the apparatus of 
biological regulation [the limbic system], but also from it and with it’, our emotional 
responses “mark,” or represent, the body’s (soma’s) interests in decision making. In other 
words, when decisions involve cooperation, these affective markers are nature’s way of 
predisposing individuals to capture potential future rewards from current cooperation. 
 
2.  Methods 
2a)   The Experiment 
  We assessed individual differences in subjects’ propensity to cooperate 
experimentally, using a computerized series of: a) twenty one-shot PD games; b) twenty one-
shot Chicken games; c) an Ultimatum game as the proposer; d) an Ultimatum game as the 
responder; e) a Dictator game, and finally f) one more PD game shown first with a male name 
[John] for the column player and then with a female name [Susan]. The games were run on a 
custom-designed series of web pages. 
  One hundred and three university student players from a variety of disciplines were 
recruited in groups of 6-10 to play the games in a computer lab. No subject participated in 
more than one session. Subjects sat in front of a computer on which the introductory web-
page for the experiment was displayed. The administrator also projected the display onto a 
large white screen at the front of the lab, to assist in the explanation. The students were 
shown how to read the matrix displays (which also had a verbal explanation next to each 
matrix) and how to record their guesses of how others might choose in the same game. After 
completing some practice games and having an opportunity to ask questions, subjects were 
left to complete the series of games in their own time.  
                                                                                                                                                        
3 We thank Martin Dufwenberg for suggesting this connection.   10 
  For payment, an incentive-compatible design was used, and explained carefully 
during the introduction. We used a fictional currency, Ducats, with 1 Ducat = A$2. Students 
were paired according to an ID number placed inside a sealed envelope beside each 
computer. The ID joining the pair was not revealed until the end of the experiment, so the 
identity of the other player could not be known until all decisions of both players had been 
completed. In other words, there were no opportunities for communication, feedback or 
learning, minimising any super-game effects.  
When the players had been paired, one of the pair drew a ticket from a box containing 
a number from 1-45. This ticket selected the game to be played out. Both players’ responses 
to this game were then retrieved and they were paid according to the choice combination that 
resulted.  It was not possible to know which one of the games would be played out for money 
until all games had been played. So, while all decisions were incentivised ex ante, only one 
game was incentivized ex post, analogous to the ‘random lottery incentive system’ used for 
individual choice experiments. For evidence in support of this methodology, see Starmer and 
Sugden (1991).  
Each player thus met their ‘pair’ when the incentivised game was retrieved and 
played, and so they witnessed the combination of their payoff and the other party’s payoff, 
although payments were collected subsequently from staff. All this was explained carefully 
prior to any choices being made. For the great majority of players their pair was not well-
known to them. In a few cases they were known to each other but those players did not 
discover this until after all choices had been made.  
We designed our experiment with only a modest degree of social distance between 
players because a greater social distance would not be conducive to the purpose our study. 
Evidence shows that use of a double-blind design for example, can fail to trigger human 
social cues sufficiently to engage our latent social tendencies (for evidence see Hoffman,   11 
McCabe and Smith 1996, or Eckel and Grossman 1998). Such designs also are susceptible to 
player’s suspicions regarding the existence of the unseen other player. If players suspect they 
are really paired with a confederate such as a computer program, the brain’s reward circuitry 
from mutual cooperation fails to activate and choice behavior approaches that of Homo 
Economicus (Rilling et al, 2002). The difficulty then is a lack of parallelism between the 
experimental context and the real life social phenomena that motivated the research in the 
first place. Interestingly, even the less extreme anonymity we used was disturbing to some of 
our players; (see sub-section 3f). Masclet et al (2003) also provide evidence that decreasing 
anonymity raises cooperation in social dilemmas. 
The games were assigned different payoff values to reflect a wide range of incentives 
to co-operate or defect, while maintaining the requisite rank-orders of the payoffs. Of course, 
defection is always dominant under the ‘me’-frame in PD games, but we hypothesized that 
for those using the ‘we’-frame the actual crystallization of cooperative choices would be 
sensitive to the trade-offs inherent in the payoff values. 
 
2b)  The Interviews 
  A male and a female graduate student in anthropology conducted tape-recorded, open-
ended interviews with 30 people, the first 15 men and 15 women from our main sample to 
volunteer for this part of the research. Volunteers received a fee of $20 for the interview. 
Prior to the conversation, the interviewer was provided with a printout summarizing the play 
of the interviewee in the games session. Interviewers began showing interviewees a diagram 
of the first game (a prisoners’ dilemma) they had played and asking why they had made the 
choice they did and what they were thinking of when they made this choice. Interviewees 
were also reminded of their estimate of the other player’s choice and asked what they were 
thinking about the other player when they were deciding which choice to make.    12 
These initial questions were followed by seven more regarding the games the students 
had played. Finally, students were asked several questions to associate these games to 
experiences of daily life, people, relationships and cultural products such as movies and 
songs. Participants were also asked a series of questions about their feelings in the game they 
eventually played for real money, how they felt about playing and talking about the games 
and why they agreed to be interviewed. (Interview questions are listed in Appendix 1). 
Consonant with anthropological methods, the interviewers were instructed to encourage as 
open-ended, subject-directed conversation as possible. The verbatim interview transcripts 
displayed a close adherence to this stricture.   
 
2c)  The Participants: 
All participants (n = 103) were undergraduate students at the University of Western 
Australia (although some were mature age). Demographic characteristics of the full sample, 
which also shows that the students who participated in the interviews (n = 30) were not 
different to the rest (n = 73), (except for fewer females among the volunteer interviewees, as 
we aimed to interview equal numbers of men and women) are available on request from the 
authors. Summary game play of those subjects interviewed and not interviewed, and then of 
men and women separately, is shown in Table 1. 
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 1 about here. 
------------------------------ 
 
2d)  The Analysis: 
  In-depth, qualitative analysis of the thirty interviews is a necessarily intensive and 
time-consuming activity. The technique discussed in Section 3, inspired largely by Quinn 
(1997, 2005), requires repeated readings of the verbatim interview transcripts.  Thirty 
interviews are sufficiently representative of the full sample and provide enough text for   13 
analysis, without incurring burdensome transcription and other time costs. Our decision in 
this regard is consistent with current practice in anthropology for qualitative analysis.  
As a first step in the analysis one of us conducted a debriefing with each of the two 
interviewers, asking them for overall impressions of the content and the general tone of the 
interviews they had conducted. Several themes, metaphors and patterns were found to be 
important. We discuss these in detail in Section 3.  
 
3.  Interpretations of the Interviews    
3a)  Key Experimental Results 
The interviews are interpreted to provide an overall picture of the ways in which 
players describe their play. To provide context, Table 2 summarizes the pattern of play for 
each of the interviewees and assigns each a participant number. We then use this number to 
let the reader tie each of the more significant quotations back to the summary of their play.  
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 2 about here. 
------------------------------ 
 
  While the current paper does not seek to explain or model the data from the full 
sample of one hundred and three players, it is instructive to describe some of the main 
aggregate findings which will assist interpretation of subjects’ comments. Overall, proposer 
offers in the ultimatum game averaged $13.75, or 45.8% of the ‘pie’. For the dictator game 
the figure was $10.13, or 33.8% of the ‘pie’. The mean minimum average offer (MAO) a 
respondent would accept in the ultimatum game was $11.86. By gender the only significant 
difference was for the dictator game: males offered $11.06 and females $9.66, suggesting 
males are slightly more generous in this domain. These figures are in line with, or slightly 
higher than, the bulk of previous studies summarised in Camerer (2003, chapter 2).   14 
  For the 20 chicken games the mean percent cooperative choices across all games was 
68%: 64.1% for males and 70.7% for females, suggesting females are slightly less greedy in 
this context. The lowest mean percent cooperation in any chicken game was 15%, and the 
highest was 89%. For the 20 prisoner’s dilemma games, the overall mean cooperation percent 
across all games was 25.4%: 20.6% for males but 28.0% for females, reinforcing the previous 
observation. The lowest mean percent cooperation in any PD game was 7% and the highest 
was 55%. These results are broadly consistent with Niederle and Vesterlund’s (2007) work 
which found women have a lesser preference for competitive behaviour than men. 
  There were a small number of significant correlations in play across games. One 
unsurprising link is that the less one offers as a proposer in the ultimatum game, the less one 
offers as a dictator. Another link is that the less one offers as a proposer or as a dictator, the 
less one cooperates in chicken games. As defection in chicken games reflects greed rather 
than fear, this connection also makes intuitive sense. It may be that such players are also less 
risk-averse, because a low offer in the ultimatum game and defecting in the chicken game are 
both relatively risky strategies. In general, a relatively risk-averse pattern of behaviour across 
domains would also include a high frequency of defection in PD’s.  
There is some evidence from social psychology (summarised in Van Vugt and Van 
Lang, 2006) that measures of social value orientation find some 60% of people are disposed 
to maximise mutual gains (pro-socials), some 30% seek to maximise individual gain 
(individualists) and 10% to maximise relative gains (competitive types), however the latter 
two categories can’t be separated by play in our games. Experimental economics has also 
found evidence for similar types; see in particular Kurzban and Houser, 2005. If we take 
these proportions as a broad generalisation for our subject pool, then count the total number 
of cooperative choices in the PD and Chicken games, we find the least cooperative 42 of 103 
subjects chose ‘A’ 17 or fewer times out of a possible 40. Of these 42, 14 are in our pool of   15 
interviewees and we have identified them in Table 2 with the Subject subscript “su” for 
‘selfish, uncooperative’. An alternative measure of selfishness is giving in the Dictator game, 
which we call ‘selfish-dictator’ or “sd”. In our subject pool, 36 of 103 subjects offered strictly 
less than $10 to the other player, and of these 11 are in our pool of interviewees. 
Interestingly, and consistent with Bacharach’s assumption that ‘we’-thinking doesn’t extend 
to constant-sum games, only 4 of these 11 players are also selfish using the ‘uncooperative’ 
definition. 
On average the ‘selfish, uncooperative’ type offered an average of $8.83 in the 
Dictator game, compared with $11.02 for the cooperative types, a difference marginally 
insignificant at the 10% level. Similarly, ‘selfish, dictator’ types cooperated an average of 
17.1 times out of 40 in the PD and Chicken games, compared with 19.5 for the altruistic 
types, a difference marginally significant at the 10% level. These results are consistent with 
Bacharach’s framework which distinguishes altruism in the context of constant-sum games 
from choices in games with a degree of common interest; only defection in Chicken games 
seems related to Dictator giving.  
 
3b)  Frames 
Although we anticipated players would make reference to concepts such as 
selfishness and fairness, the anthropological method we employ seeks only to guide players 
to reflect upon our questions, while avoiding ‘leading’ participants by making explicit 
reference to specific concepts. Several concepts and issues were nonetheless raised explicitly 
by participants in a number of the interviews, which we reflect in the sub-headings below. 
We discuss these alongside relevant quotes from the transcripts. While some of these 
concepts offer support to standard economic theory, many appear at odds with it and instead 
support alternative models. Also noteworthy are some interesting subtleties in players’   16 
perceptions of these concepts compared with the assumptions commonly made in behavioral 
game theory research. We shall see examples of these also. Other comments, such as on the 
efficacy of using financial incentives and direct evidence that players’ make mistakes also 
arise, but less frequently. 
 
3c) Selfishness 
Not surprisingly, the interviews provided plenty of evidence that many players 
embrace self-interest as the motive for their decisions, even if they know others will lose out. 
We can see this in the words of one female: 
 
I: What did you imagine about the other player? 
S2: Selfish like me, trying to optimize his incentives and all that. I will assume that he 
will also choose B throughout, if he has caught the whole of the game.  
I: What would you think of him if he just chose A?  
S: At the beginning of the [series of] games, probably that he doesn’t know. At the 
end… I would probably think that he was very stupid.  
I: So if they are still going for A by the end of the [experiment]… 
S: He cannot survive in this world, if he’s going to continue choosing A. 
 
Or this man, who offered his respondent $0 in the Dictator Game: 
 
S14: I wanted to offer them nothing, basically, because it maximizes what I get. I 
wanted to keep $30 dollars myself. 
 
One female interviewee gave the following reflections on her play: 
 
S24: Yeah, I can be pretty competitive, and if I can do something to outdo the next 
person to get me in front then I’ll do it.   17 
I: Do you think if you had known which person you were playing against that this 
would have affected your choice?  
S: Yes, because when I met the girl I was playing against for the last game, she 
seemed really polite, she let me pick the number out and she was quite shy and that. 
Just my perception was that she was ‘A’…and that would have made me play B for 
all the extra money anyway. 
 
  Clearly, these participants conveyed no hint of we-thinking, guilt-aversion, or other 
social preferences. The following woman acknowledged one of her decisions was selfish, but 
seems uncomfortable about it, and gave a careful explanation to justify her motivation when 
she decided to keep $30 and give the respondent $0 in the Dictator Game: 
 
S18: I guess for me, my thinking changed in that I thought… to be selfish to a stranger, 
where their life still continues on going as it was going before….  being unselfish to a 
stranger really had no effect on their life except in that one instance, that one moment, 
and even then, they might not notice it or it might not even trigger a reaction, they just 
carry on [with] their life as it was;  but to be unselfish to someone I know, it does 
affect where they are going because I am a part of their life as opposed to a part of a 
stranger’s life. 
 
  But not all players accept that self-interest either did or should guide their choices in 
these games, as we see in the next sub-section. 
    
3d)   The Fairness Affect 
    Because we asked the students how they felt about the game they eventually played 
for money it is not a surprise to find emotion words in their answers.  Psycho-cultural frames 
would necessarily intervene between any evolved psychobiological potentials to cooperate or   18 
compete and actual behavior, and are a necessary part of, or reflection of, individual 
experience in early risk and uncertainty via the attachment process (Bretherton and 
Munholland 2008). But following Wierzbicka (1999; see also Reddy 1997, 2001) we assume 
that what humans as a species share are feelings. In contrast emotions are more complex, 
subjective, culturally influenced experiences of feeling states; they are the emergent products 
of those feelings manifested in players’ perceptual frames.  
The interviewers asked many of the student players not only how they felt about the 
choices in the game played out, but also how they would have felt if it had  acted differently, 
and if, say, instead of coming out even, they had won more or less than the other person. 
Players associate good feelings with receiving an equal amount or winning more than one’s 
pair. Bad feelings are associated with winning less than one’s pair, but also for some players 
with winning more. Both men and women said they expected to feel bad if they were to win 
at the other player’s expense.  An example for one woman follows: 
 
S16: [If I got more than the other player] I might have felt bad. . . ‘Oh now she thinks 
I’m really selfish because I took the higher number’.  
I: What would you find hard about [taking more]?  
S: Thinking that the other person is not happy with it or thinking that the other person 
is disappointed in me or… ‘Selfish’ comes to mind, that I am taking more than I 
should or not caring enough about what the other person wants or needs. 
 
  This woman’s reflections are clearly consistent with the concept of guilt-aversion 
(Battigalli and Dufwenberg 2007). However guilt-aversion can only promote cooperation in 
games where defection has a greed motive; if there is only a fear motive at play, guilt-
aversion would not raise cooperation. Indeed, one might say that guilt aversion is fear of   19 
being greedy! This suggests that chicken games provide a better test for the guilt-aversion 
hypothesis than prisoner’s dilemma games.  
The introduction of these hypothetical situations into the interview was initiated by 
the interviewers, spontaneously and independently, by asking the student how they would 
feel in the event that they won more than the other player.  Out of the twelve interviewees 
asked this question, the replies of eleven included an expression of feeling bad. While 
offering clearest support to guilt-aversion as a motive, this finding is not necessarily 
inconsistent with either inequality-aversion or ‘we- thinking’. 
One man gave the following thoughtful explanation for equality when his proposer 
chose to keep $15 and offer him $15 in the first Ultimatum Game: 
 
S23: I mean there is no point in being selfish. The way I see it is that if you have $30, 
give $15 and keep $15 – it makes sense to do it that way. 
I: How do you respond when you meet people who don’t share that attitude [of 
equality]?  
S: I just feel a bit sad because… either they haven’t been taught, or they are simply 
ignorant so they become selfish, and, well,  I guess there is not much I can do about it 
except show them by what I do, because I think my actions do speak louder than my 
words, so I want to really show them what it means to share equally, rather than just 
try to talk you out of it, which doesn’t help much, so I want to prove it to you by 
doing it. 
 
  The following man interpreted standard instructions for the Dictator game as ‘you 
were meant to split [the $30]’ which might come as a surprise to some experimentalists: 
 
S25: It was the fairest way to go. It was not like I didn’t like the other person, or if I 
didn’t, I didn’t know it… and I was asked to split it and you were meant to split it –   20 
and you know, that suggests that you aren’t meant to keep it for yourself – then split it 
half and half… if you don’t know why you’re splitting it then that would be the fairest 
way to go. 
 
  The next male player justified his willingness to share by reference to the money 
being unearned by him: 
 
I: Would you have considered offering $5?  
S26: To the other person? No!  
I: Why?  
S: Because in this sort of situation… it’s not as if I have done all the hard work and 
they have done nothing and they deserve less than me.  
I: So what if it was actually your money and you had earned it or whatever?  
S: If I had earned it working and the other person hadn’t as much, I would have taken 
a higher share, if I felt I had done more. By the same token, if I felt they had done 
more, I would have been more than happy to accept the fact that they should get more 
profit from it.  
 
  His comments may go some way to explaining why it is that individuals who are 
generous to the point of equality in the context of a Dictator game exhibit proportionally 
much less generosity in society at large when it comes to donating a substantial fraction of 
their salary to charity. We return to this point in sub-section 3f). The extant literature on the 
existence of a ‘house money’ effect is mixed. While Thaler and Johnson (1990) first raised 
this possibility, Clark (2002) found little support for it. Our experiment made no attempt to 
test for this effect, we simply note some of our participants made unprompted reflections 
which appear to be consistent with it.   21 
Twenty-five of the thirty interviewees ended up winning equal sums of money either 
because they and their pair both chose ‘A’; both chose ‘B’; or evenly split the money in the 
Ultimatum or Dictator Games. There was a suggestion of gender difference, at least in the 
way players’ talked about this experience. Seventeen of these twenty five participants who 
won equal sums described the game in ‘we’-terms. A second kind of answer, however, one 
we might label competitive, characterized three of these twenty five replies, all those of men. 
An example follows: 
 
S14: We both chose B. She wasn’t supposed to choose that one. I would have liked 
more [money].  
 
Another gave an answer that was a blend of the two: 
 
S21: We both got ‘A’. . . I am kind of glad that we did get the same thing because you 
would have felt really, really guilty . . . you would remember it, maybe not for the 
whole year, but maybe for a week or so afterwards . . . you left [the other player] with 
not much and you got all this money. 
 
  Four of the thirty interviewees ‘won’ the ‘real money’ game, two men and two 
women. Both of the women focused on their pleasure in winning, for example:   
 
S24: I got $38 and she got $18 because I played B and she played A . . . I was happy 
that I won. And then I heard how much she was getting, I went ‘Sorry’, but I was 
really happy that I had beaten her, basically. And I think I was the highest out of that 
[session], so ‘Yeah, I won!’ 
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In contrast both male winners expressed concern for the other player they had 
disadvantaged. One said he offered to split his win of $20 with the woman he played against 
who had won only $8. She refused his offer. The other male winner comments: 
 
S28: I played against a girl. I got 11 [Ducats, or $22] and she got nothing. I felt quite 
bad. It was as if I had taken something from her and left her with nothing. But, it was 
her particular choice. She chose wrong and I chose right. 
 
  The only interviewee out of the thirty to ‘lose’ the game played out received only $8 
compared to the other player’s $28. Her emotion was negative: 
 
S6: Yeah, I was a bit annoyed because the choice that she chose, I didn’t think she 
would choose. Like my whole plan… which was a lot of the A’s… she actually didn’t 
go that way, she went a different way.  So I thought, ‘Yeah, the whole thing must be 
wrong’. 
 
3e)   ‘We’-thinking  
While our students were not part of any well-defined team, they did share some 
common experiences, such as all being UWA students participating in the same experiment 
to see if they could win money from Professors. Our design’s use of intermediate social 
distance, by allowing players to see the community of other volunteers, and our use of 
symmetric payoffs in PD and Chicken games, is also likely to have enhanced the possibility 
of group identification and so ‘we-thinking’. One kind of answer which we interpret as 
statements of team-identification was found in the texts of both men and women. Here are 
some examples: 
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S: I think we both picked ‘A’ and it came out as 10 [Ducats] each. I was glad I went 
with A. I was relieved that the other person went with A as well. I thought, ‘Hey, 
maybe they thought like I did’.    
 
Or this woman: 
 
S6: I guess I was imagining someone identical to me, and I was just thinking about 
them as, basically what I choose would be what they would choose. I didn’t really 
think that it could be someone who is just jumping out and wanting to get like all the 
big money and taking big risks, because that obviously didn’t come into any of my 
choices. So basically it was someone with the same ideas as me. 
 
Or in the words of another woman: 
 
S12: When I was doing it I was thinking that if I was going to do this then why 
wouldn’t they do the same thing, basically. 
 
One male interviewee implicitly identifies the difference between a PD and a zero-sum game 
for a ‘we’-thinker: 
 
S1: I was thinking about Monopoly… but I don’t really think there is any connection 
because I play Monopoly a lot different, I don’t share at all in Monopoly. You go all 
out to try and kill the other person, pretty much. Whereas, in this game, I am likely to 
sympathize with the other person a lot more, basically because you don’t lose in a 
game. You can only win and I think, ‘hey, why don’t we win together?’ 
 
  This participant also appears to share the view that because players can’t lose any of 
their own money, there is no opportunity cost to playing fair. We will see more evidence of 
this perspective in sub-section 3h).  
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3f) Anonymity 
Over half of the interviewees raised a series of points that revolve around the issues of 
playing with an unknown person or a computer instead of a known person or a friend. The 
remarks from eighteen of the thirty interviewees made the point that their play would have 
been different if they had known the person they were playing. 
 
S25: I ended up playing my friend . . . Well, we didn’t actually know until it was the 
end of the game, so you can’t really collaborate. 
 
For some of the players, ‘knowing’ someone might only take a few minutes.  
 
S: I think some of the decisions might have been different if you had five minutes to 
sort of get to know the person you were playing against. I am sure that would have 
affected… some of my responses. 
 
Or this man:  
S11: I wish I could have had a better idea of who I was playing against because I think 
if I had been able to know who it was or talk to them before hand, not about the game, 
but just to talk to them to get an idea of who they were. 
 
  So ‘knowing’ someone may only take a brief meeting, supporting evidence in Dawes 
(1991), on the rapid acquisition of group identity. Bacharach [2006, chapter 2] also needs this 
assumption for his theory to have explanatory power. Five of the participants mentioned that 
they looked around the room trying to learn something about the other players. Four men 
mentioned that they would have chosen to cooperate had they known the other player; for 
example: 
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S: Obviously it would always be best if the two players playing off each other knew 
who they were and knew what they were thinking. And also it would be great if you 
could discuss it with them before each game and work out . . . which [choice-pair] 
was the most money and split it. 
 
  The woman who said even five minutes with the other player would make a 
difference also said that if she had met the other player and ‘didn’t like them, then I would 
have gone for the higher [B] option.’ This hints at a need for ‘assurance’ regarding the other’s 
choice, itself an important issue in this literature. While Sugden (2003) sees assurance as 
necessary before acting on we-thinking, Bacharach’s (2006, p.168) theory of circumspect 
team-thinking does not.  
  Knowing the other player’s identity often seemed to represent information that could 
have been used by our players, had our experiment permitted it. We explained earlier why 
our experiment avoided artificially asocial conditions; but the degree of anonymity we used 
still caused our players some consternation. Seven of the fifteen men and three of the fifteen 
women volunteered that information about the other player would have informed their play or 
that their play was difficult because they lacked this information. In the texts of nine men and 
six women, discussions of the known person/stranger contrast were associated with sharing. 
One interviewee provided the following account in her interview: 
 
S3: If someone ended up really worse, say someone got $2 and someone got $20, 
often they ended up just splitting it when they went up to the offices [to get their 
payout on the ‘game played for real’].  
I: Did they? 
S: Yeah, because they felt so bad that they had done so much better than the other 
person…Well because at first you think, ‘This is great’, but when it actually comes   26 
down to it… you don’t actually want to be getting more than everybody else when 
everybody else has done the same as you.  It just seems fair that everyone gets around 
about the same. 
 
  Three points regarding this observation should be made. First, while initially the 
choice was made in a PD game, a subsequent decision to share occurs instead in a Dictator 
situation. This is because the strategic element of the initial decision is over, and the winning 
player now faces a choice over whether to share a fixed sum with the other person. Clearly, 
defecting in the context of a PD does not indicate that a player would give the other person 
zero in a Dictator game. Indeed, the correlation between the number of cooperative choices in 
the series of PD’s and the level of giving in the Dictator game was not statistically significant 
in this study (Brosig, 2002, p.285, found a similar result).  
Second, as the ‘winner’ may now view herself as having earned her reward, her 
generosity may be lessened compared with the usual Dictator Game scenario (see also sub-
section 3h). Third, the anonymous conditions under which the initial decision in the PD was 
made are removed when a game is selected to be played out, replacing the unknown other 
player with an identifiable person. This can be expected to increase generosity by the 
‘winner’, hence the occasional belated offer to share. Consistent with this interpretation, nine 
participants associated the known person/stranger contrast with future consequences, 
demonstrating a concern for their reputation. For example, referring back to her reasons for 
splitting the $30 as she did, one woman draws an analogy to her sister: 
 
S7: She … would be one that is most likely to battle me to the death, until it is like 
evenly split.  She wouldn’t give in, because she knows…that there will be another 
fight a week, a month, down the track.  
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  The previous two quotes appear to be consistent with the ‘inequality-aversion’ 
concept. Taking a different tack, one man focused on the anonymity of the games in contrast 
with real life: 
 
S28: I think that is probably a big thing, the fact that you have anonymity there. That 
people won’t know who it is that’s choosing the bigger numbers or going for this, 
therefore it can't reflect back upon yourself and people’s opinion of you. So, self 
image perhaps, self-presentation.  
 
Or another man: 
 
S4: And it is kind of difficult because you were under controlled situations where you 
are asked not to know who the other person is, or not to talk with them or anything 
like that, and it made it difficult because it takes away something that you rely on as a 
person. Like learning how to write and then you lose your hands. You’ve lost 
something that you rely on to communicate with.  
 
  All of these quotes are consistent with extant evidence that the ‘social distance’ 
created by the experimental conditions can affect play (Hoffman, McCabe and Smith 1996). 
When playing out a game for money, players did briefly meet; for some this was a moment of 
discomfort: 
 
S21: The guy who [I talk about earlier] chose B. . .He got $32. . . [the other player got 
nothing] . . . I think amongst us, because none of us actually knew the person who got 
nothing, it was like ‘Wow, good on you, you got this money’. . .You know I think we 
could all see . . . he was feeling guilty that he had left [the other player] with nothing, 
we could all see quite easily how he would feel guilty about it . . .We kind of stood 
around waiting to see how he was going to react to getting the money before saying,   28 
‘Congratulations’, while he was feeling really guilty, it’s like you were trying to 
congratulate him for getting the most instead of saying, ‘Oh, you left this girl with 
nothing’. 
 
3g)   Safety 
One notable pattern was the oft-repeated description of one’s own choice, whether of 
A or of B, as taking the safe option. Because the B option is usually referred to as the strategy 
of defection, we found some players’ self-description of their B choice as safe rather than 
selfish pointing to fear rather than greed as the motive. Out of the 30 interviews, 11 
participants used the words ‘safe’ or ‘safety’ as one influence on their own choices in the 
games. For example, ‘Most of what I chose was the safe option...so there wasn’t a lot of risk’, 
said one female player. Three of these eleven players were describing the A option with these 
words, seven, however, were describing their choice of the ‘selfish’ B option, and one player 
was describing her choice of first A and then B in different games. (Recall that those players 
using the word safety to mean avoiding the choice with the lowest outcome will choose B in 
a PD game but A in a Chicken game.) 
  While 11 interviewees used the words “safe” or “safety” to describe their play, a total 
of 16 interviewees, 9 women and 7 men, used these words at some point in the interviews; for 
example, to describe how they viewed others’ play.  In the vast majority of statements it was 
apparent that safe was being contrasted to the word ‘risk’. In both the men’s and women’s 
interviews, but especially in women’s
4
                                                 
4 Eckel and Grossman (2002) survey and build upon evidence that shows women tend to greater risk-aversion 
than men, albeit with substantial heterogeneity within both genders. 
, harm minimization seems a fair way of interpreting 
what is being said when players talk about ‘playing it safe’. For example, one woman said: 
“we never picked the option where we could get zero… we just played it safe because it 
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would be kind of crappy to come out of it with nothing’.  Another woman said, ‘B would be 
the safe option because you would definitely get some money’. A third said, ‘I would have 
chosen ones where you would at least get something, that’s better than risking it all for a big 
number and getting zero…it is always better to get something than nothing’.   
  It thus seems a legitimate interpretive move to return to the interview texts to see how 
many others described their play in terms of harm minimization, though they did not actually 
use the words safe or safety. This increased the number of interviewees whose choices appear 
to be influenced by self-protective concerns to 20, that is, two-thirds of the 30 interviewees 
were explicitly motivated, at least in part, by a fear of receiving the lowest outcome. For 
example, one man explained, ‘If I selected A and they selected B I would have nothing, so in 
selecting B I still would have got something regardless.’ Five other students used the words 
safe or safety at some point in the interview to describe others play or in generalizations from 
the game to life. Taken together, these reflections provide support for the game-theoretic 
concept of choosing so as to maximize the minimum outcome through a fear of being 
exploited.  
  The possible relevance of this observation is suggested by one female player 
generalizing from her game play to her life experiences and expectations: 
 
S2: In Singapore, it’s like a dog-eat-dog world out there. If you don’t make it, that’s it. 
The government is not going to give you welfare programs; they are not going to give 
you funds or whatever. They just remind you to save early and then spend later, that 
sort of thing. . . It’s much slower in Perth. People don’t compete as much. In 
Singapore it is very bad. You start from when you are very young.  You have to have 
the top grades to make it to the best school. If you don’t make it to the best school, 
you make sure you excel.  
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Returning to the safe/risk contrasts and their associations, three of the men made 
reference to the other player being unknown. For example one man, commenting on the 
games generally, said:  
 
S11: I definitely didn’t like that I didn’t know the person. . .I was actually thinking 
about that quite a bit as I was playing. . .it was like. . .what is this person really going 
to do?  I figured it was better to play it safe than to try to go for it all and trust the 
other person to do the same.  
 
  Another male player imagined relationships in his associations to the risk/safe 
contrast.  He made the following comment about his decision in the Dictator Game: ‘In 
choosing $15 you are taking the safer way, or the more likeable’ He then went on to 
generalize to life experience saying:  
 
S28: I think that friendship and relationship between others is very important to 
everybody. . . And they like to keep that, they wouldn’t want to hurt people or, get 
people on the bad side of them . . . So I think that people prefer to play it safe . . . 
They don’t want to get on the wrong side of the mob.         
 
  His last comment also suggests another, darker, concept of risk, this time leading to 
cooperation rather than defection. It ties in with an alternative explanation for the existence of 
‘we-thinking’ frames; the concept of ‘Machiavellian Intelligence’ has been shown to be an 
important factor in the evolution of the human brain and its capacity for predicting the 
intentions and responses of others (e.g., Dunbar 1993).  
 
3h)   The ‘Experimenter’s Money’ Fallacy 
One female commented as follows:   31 
 
S15: Well in respect to the money… it just doesn’t seem right to me that I should get 
more than the other person when I have done nothing to earn the money. It’s not mine 
anyway; it’s just being shared or divided between us. If it’s going to be divided 
between us then ‘fair’, to me, is that each person gets treated equally without 
preference. 
 
A male player made a similar comment, having chosen to give the other player $15 in 
the Ultimatum Game:  
 
S30: Well if someone is giving me $30 free and there’s two people then I would give it 
out evenly, because it is not my money to start with and I am just getting it free, so it 
is a bonus anyway. 
 
For them, as for a number of other interviewees, two things seem to be going on. One 
is the distinction between earned and unearned money, in which generosity with the latter 
feels much more natural than with the former (see Guala and Mittone (2010), on the impact 
of such social norms). The importance of this distinction has probably been under-
emphasized in the existing experimental literature on cooperation and generosity in 
laboratory experiments, which for the most part use ‘unearned’ money. Cherry et al (2002) is 
a notable exception; they found that if the proposer has to earn the money before dividing it, 
the proportion of proposers in Dictator Games offering zero rose from 19% when unearned to 
79% when earned. 
Importantly, Ruffle (1998) found that when the recipient successfully wins a test of 
skill with other recipients, thereby increasing the sum for their dictator to divide, the average 
dictator offer rises to nearly half of the ‘pie’. In fact 21% of dictators offered more than half 
of their money to the recipient, an allocation almost never observed in typical dictator games.   32 
The closest analogy to Ruffle’s result is probably the ‘trust’ game in which a trusting player 1 
creates a surplus for a player 2 who is free to decide how much of it to return to player 1. See 
Camerer (2003, pp.59-68) for a summary of additional studies which vary methodological 
and demographic variables in Ultimatum and Dictator Games. 
Second, the concept of opportunity cost does not seem to be readily understood. 
Players’ do not appear to view their participation in the experiment as earning them this 
money. Just because the money wasn’t theirs before the experiment does not imply it is not 
theirs now, so cooperative and altruistic actions still have an opportunity cost in dollars 
foregone.  
Finally, experimental economists may benefit from a look at the diverse ways our 
seemingly straightforward instructions and features of the experiment can be (mis)interpreted 
by players. 
 
3i) Perceptions of the Presentation of the Experiment 
Perhaps naively, our recruiting literature made reference to ‘an experiment involving 
games’. This female was not impressed: 
 
S18: I didn’t expect this, the whole experiment was about games – I was expecting 
physical games – so when I came in I was quite put off by that. 
 
Another woman was more positive: 
 
S6: I found it interesting … thinking up these imaginary people in our heads and just 
deciding on what… they would be thinking.  
 
  A third female thought the backgrounds of the players would affect their ease of 
comprehension of the experiment:   33 
 
S17: It is quite alien to me to think in ‘squares’ and to make choices based on [how 
things are] positioned [relative to each other]. It took me a while to get into, … I think 
someone like an engineer would have an advantage in understanding that set up 
because that is the way they often work, with models that capture a lot with a little… 
 
  Supporting the current practice in experimental economics, the importance of 
financial incentives was noted by several subjects, for example this woman: 
 
S20: The games were fun, they were well organized… it was good that there was a 
money incentive to do it properly. I thought that was a good idea. I have done so 
many psychology experiments where there was no payment and people weren’t doing 
it properly.  
 
  Ethical issues were also touched upon by a couple of players. One man reflected on 
his previous experimental experiences: 
 
S27: I have been very suspicious of the psych department ever since they tricked us, in 
one of the labs they gave us all a sheet of paper that we all assumed was the same, 
talking about a diagnosis of mental illness. And we watched a video and were asked 
to like diagnose this person’s thing. And then we all found out that the little 
introductory thing was all different and that sneaky psych department tricked us into 
doing a primary experiment rather than doing an exercise on mental illness. 
 
  His observation raises the difficult issue of contamination of the subject pool at a 
university. The many methodological differences between experiments in psychology and in 
economics are discussed at length in Hertwig and Ortmann (2001). But it is not always easy   34 
to avoid causing distress to subjects. To our surprise, one woman found playing our games to 
be a slightly frightening experience, particularly the anonymity involved: 
 
S16: While [I was] sitting at the computer going through [the] instructions etc it all 
seemed so anonymous and so … although we had been told that we could walk away 
from it at any time -  have you seen the movie “The Game”? He [Michael Douglas] 
plays a game that he doesn’t realize is a game and all these things happen to him, he 
nearly gets killed… and I just kept thinking back to that and I was thinking… it was 
kind of scary how anonymous it was…’  
 
Fortunately she went on to say: 
 
‘I am really glad I did it. It was weird, it was strange to me, I have never done 
anything like it before, so I am really pleased I did it’ 
   
Nevertheless her experience, which was only uncovered because we took the unusual 
step of interviewing our participants, should alert experimentalists to taking care that all 
subjects are comfortable with their participation. Perhaps one reason for the pervasive dislike 
of anonymity by our participants in these games (which to experimentalists is standard 
practice) is because players feel they can spot a co-operator or a defector in real life, which 
would influence their decisions, and we deny them that opportunity (see sub-section 3f). This 
would be an illustration of the ‘Greenbeard’ effect (Dawkins, 1976) that has also been noted 
in the social psychology literature (e.g., Yamagishi et al, 2003) in which co-operators think 
they can spot and reward others who share their cooperative traits. Nor is this confidence 
necessarily misplaced: Frank et al (1993) found that co-operators in PD games who had a 
brief meeting with the other player were able to predict with more than double chance   35 
accuracy whether that other player would co-operate or defect, and Fetchenhauer et al (2010) 
report a related finding for giving in a Dictator game. 
 
5. Conclusion. 
  Application of an anthropological interview method to a behavioral games experiment 
has offered us new insight into players’ perceptions of these important games. We have seen 
that our players are heterogeneous regarding the belief systems they bring into the 
economists’ experimental environment, so that traditional game theory can describe play 
accurately only for some. The behavioral approach to game theory then needs a richer 
framework in which the diverse motives our players display can find expression. Bacharach’s 
dual-levels of agency approach is one possibility, as are other models such as guilt-aversion 
which can find expression only within the broader theoretical structure of ‘Psychological 
Game Theory’ (Battigalli and Dufwenberg, 2009). 
  Our interviews provide evidence for selfish motives, but also for the presence of 
emotions that dispose us to frame the choice as one for a dyad or to weigh the interests of 
others against our own. Extant theories such as we-thinking, inequality-aversion and guilt-
aversion may all explain part of the puzzle of human sociality, but not for all people or in all 
contexts. The interviews also point to a concern for ‘safety’ and the significance of whether a 
player conceives of their money from the experiment as being earned or unearned, as well as 
to a pervasive dislike of the common practice of anonymity in such experiments. Other 
details of the experimental instructions and context also took on relevance in unanticipated 
ways in the eyes of some players, which may prove to be of interest to experimentalists. 
  These prisms through which our players interpreted the games they played are also 
important because they help us understand the frames that influence decision-making in 
games exposing the tension between the interests of the ‘self ‘and the ‘other’. Identification   36 
of the frames behind these games is then a critical step in understanding and validating how 
each of us balances these motives.   37 
Appendix 1 
  Generally, interviews were conducted according to the protocol presented below. As 
the interviewers were instructed to follow student leads as much as possible, the order and 
number of specific questions asked varied, for example, an interviewee might answer 
Question 2 spontaneously when answering Question 1. In such a case the interviewer would 
not ask Question 2. One interviewer routinely began interviews with the last question listed 
here; the other used the order listed. 
 
Sample Interview Protocol 
1. Interviewer presents interviewee with a diagram of the first game [prisoners’ 
dilemma see diagram 1]. Here is the first game that you played and you chose [student’s 
choice]. Could you tell me why you made this choice?  What were you thinking of when you 
made this choice? 
2. In this first game, your estimate of the other player’s choice was [give number] 
indicating that you thought they would be more likely to choose [A or   B]. What were you 
thinking about the other player when you thought about what they would do? 
3. Here is a summary of a sample of your choices [read ratio of A and B]. Could you 
tell me why in [first ratio] % of the games you chose A?  Could you tell me why in [second 
ratio] % of the games you chose B?  What were you thinking about when you made your 
choices? 
4. Here is a summary of a sample of your estimates of the other players’ choices [read 
mean of expectation]. Thinking of all the games, could you tell me why you thought that the 
other player would choose A?  Thinking of all the games you played could you tell me why 
you thought the other player would choose B?  What were you thinking about when you 
made your estimates about the other player?   38 
5. In one game you were asked to propose an amount of $30 to keep in a division of 
the money with another player. You chose to keep $____.  Why did you choose this amount?  
What were you thinking about when you made this choice? 
6. You were next asked to propose an amount of the $30 that you would accept from 
the other player. You chose to accept $____.  Why did you choose this amount?  What were 
you thinking about when you made this choice? 
7.  In the next game you were asked how much of $30 you would keep for yourself if 
the other player had to accept your choice. You chose to keep $____.  Why did you choose 
this amount?  What were you thinking about when you made this choice? 
8. When you played a game with ‘John’ you chose [student’s choice]. Could you tell 
me why you made this choice?  What were you thinking of when you made this choice?  
What did you imagine about the other player? 
9. When you played a game with ‘Sue’ you chose [student’s choice]. Could you tell 
me why you made this choice?  What were you thinking of when you made this choice? 
What did you imagine about the other player? 
10. Overall did playing the games remind you of any experience in your daily life, or 
in your past? 
  11. Overall did playing the games remind you of particular people or particular 
relationships?  
12.  Overall did playing the games remind you of a particular story, poem, song or 
movie? 
13.  In the game you played for real with another player, how did you feel about the 
choice you made?  How did you feel about the other player’s choice? 
14.  Overall what do you think/feel about the games and talking about playing them? 
15. Why did you choose to be interviewed about the games?   39 
Table 1: Summary Data 
 
 
 
Full sample 
(n = 103)* 
 
Interviewed  
(n = 30)* 
Not 
interviewed 
(n = 73)* 
 
P< 
Variable  N  N  N   
  102  30  72   
         
Chicken A  68.00  63.00  70.00  .11 
Chicken P  63.89  64.26  63.74  .84 
         
Prisoner A  25.40  26.50  24.93  .77 
Prisoner P  39.86  45.63  37.49  .08 
         
Ultimatum Keep  16.29  16.27  16.30  .95 
Ultimatum Accept  11.89  11.77  11.95  .86 
Dictator Keep  19.88  19.67  19.96  .85 
         
    Male 
(n = 34)* 
Female 
(n = 68)* 
 
         
Chicken A    64.12  70.10  .11 
Chicken P    61.87  64.76  .24 
         
Prisoner A    20.59  28.01  .14 
Prisoner P    33.36  42.66  .04 
         
Ultimatum Keep    16.12  16.32  .69 
Ultimatum Accept    11.41  12.09  .48 
Dictator Keep    18.94  20.34  .34 
           40 
Table 2: Interviewee’s Choices in the Games 
 
Subject 
%  
Cooperation 
in PD 
Games 
% 
Cooperation 
in Chicken 
Games 
$ Offer in 
Ultimatum  
Game 
$ Offer 
in 
Dictator 
Game 
% 
Expectation 
of 
Cooperation 
in PD 
Games 
% 
Expectation 
of 
Cooperation 
in Chicken 
Games 
S1 ♂  60  70  10  15  65.8  71.0 
S2 ♀, su, sd  5  25  15  0  97.5  77.4 
S3 ♀, su, sd  5  75  10  5  34.2  70.8 
S4 ♂, su  10  65  15  15  8.7  90.0 
S5 ♀  40  75  15  15  37.2  48.2 
S6 ♀, sd  65  90  15  5  63.5  65.0 
S7 ♀  45  55  10  10  57.8  76.5 
S8 ♂, sd  25  70  15  0  55.2  60.4 
S9 ♂, su  10  70  15  15  19.2  59.1 
S10 ♂, sd  20  70  10  5  44.3  67.9 
S11 ♂, su  10  60  15  10  21.7  45.7 
S12 ♀, sd  20  75  12  5  35.1  63.7 
S13 ♀  30  70  15  15  54.2  69.2 
S14 ♂, su, sd  5  50  15  0  32.6  46.5 
S15 ♀  30  65  15  15  47.8  56.4 
S16 ♀  45  85  15  15  54.7  62.4 
S17 ♀, su  10  15  10  10  70.5  73.5 
S18 ♀, sd  75  55  15  0  90.0  73.9 
S19 ♀  45  55  15  10  59.0  54.2 
S20 ♀, su  15  65  15  15  54.8  69.4   41 
S21 ♂, sd  40  80  15  5  45.6  66.9 
S22 ♀, sd  15  75  15  5  25.2  64.8 
S23 ♂  75  75  15  30  43.2  53.2 
S24 ♀  30  65  10  15  50.2  60.2 
S25 ♂, su  5  60  15  15  30.3  71.0 
S26 ♂, su  15  65  15  15  19.2  61.2 
S27 ♂, su, sd  10  35  15  0  50.6  56.8 
S28 ♂, su  5  50  10  15  19.4  57.7 
S29 ♂, su  20  55  15  15  43.5  72.8 
S30 ♂, su  10  70  15  15  36.9  60.9 
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